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therapeutic attention, essentially making it a nonissue for
most people. In contrast, homosexuality in Poland was
considered a moral failing, and in the context of the
Catholic Church’s “outsized role,” activists were not able
to consolidate a national coalition before Poland joined the
EU. Chapter 3 compares the rise of the “hard-right
backlash” in the early 2000s in Poland—in which political
parties and their allies politicized the issue of homosexu-
ality with strident homophobia and linked gay rights to
Europeanization—to the mostly tepid backlash in the
Czech Republic.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the resulting dynamics in the
years leading up to (1998–2004) and then following EU
accession (2004–12). In Poland, activists responded to the
hard-right’s bans on Pride marches and tacit approval of
homophobic violence by embracing the EU’s human rights
framing, creating more formal organizations, and becoming
explicitly political. By 2010, they were mobilized enough to
host EuroPride in Warsaw, the ﬁrst postcommunist city to
host this European-wide event, and had found important
allies, including a political party (Twój Ruch). In contrast,
the Czech movement fragmented and lost important state
funding. The remaining Czech groups focused on the single
issue of registered partnerships, which they achieved in quite
limited form in 2007, and then disbanded. In the process,
they worked through informal, personalized contacts with
parliamentarians, missing opportunities to create broader
support or to push for other important reforms. Instead of
facing backlash as in Poland, the problem was co-optation
by a mostly indifferent state.
This in-depth qualitative analysis is reinforced by some
quantitative analysis and some minicomparisons. The
author uses quantitative data on attitudes toward homo-
sexuality and LGBT rights to substantiate the notable
differences between Western and postcommunist Europe,
as well as multivariate regression to substantiate the
hypothesis about the positive impact of the promise of
EU membership on LGBT legal rights. Chapter 7
examines activism in Hungary, whose trajectory was quite
similar to that in Poland, though the hard-right has had
more electoral success; in Slovakia, whose trajectory is
most like that in the Czech Republic, even though it is
a more closed society; and in Romania, where backlash
came before the EU pressure but together these forces
boosted the movement. The book’s argument is strength-
ened in the conclusion, which adds evenmore comparisons,
showing how the Polish women’s movement’s trajectory is
similar to that of LGBT rights, considering why Roma
rights movements in postcommunist Europe have not had
the same growth, and then comparing the trends in LGBT
movements around the world.
Coming Out of Communism is a tour de force in
comparative analysis, interrogating civil society—which is
notoriously difﬁcult to study—and covering issues often
ignored by the ﬁeld. Most in conversation with Philip
Ayoub’s When States Come Out: Europe’s Sexual Minorities
and the Politics of Visibility (2016), the book speaks to
multiple central literatures in political science. Like Ayoub,
O’Dwyer analyzes the impact of transnational inﬂuence on
norm diffusion by examining the EU’s recent pressure on
LGBT rights, pointing to the visibility that such pressure
can bring but also to the impact of opponents. However, the
author is more concerned with social movement theorizing,
making two important assertions that differ from Ayoub:
ﬁrst, that we should think about movement success beyond
policy outcomes and, second, that threats to the “immediate
protective surround” of individuals—often engendered by
backlash—is one powerful way to overcome the collective
action problem. While O’Dwyer might not agree—by
bringing into focus the mobilization of marginalized “sexual
minorities”—I think that his book challenges the common
wisdom that postcommunist civil society can be character-
ized as weak, in the 1990s or today.
The book raises two concerns for me. First, while I
agree that social movements are more than their legislative
success, I hesitate to use the vibrancy of a movement as the
only measure of its success, especially considering the high
personal costs paid by LGBT activists and allies in Poland
with the return of the hard-right in 2015. Feminist
political science has many, and more nuanced, answers
to this question of what counts as success for women’s/
feminist activism—as well as numerous studies of the EU’s
impact on violence against women—that could have been
usefully considered here. Second, I think that the book
glosses over the strategic political choices made by the hard-
right, thereby failing to interrogate their claim that Europe
is responsible for their homophobia. For example, the book
asserts that “[t]he EU’s promotion of LGBT-rights norms
in applicant-states provoked varying degrees of hard-right
backlash” (p. 18), even as the EU could do very little really
to protect LGBT individuals. As others who have a global
lens have asserted, I suspect that the postcommunist hard-
right leaders chose to attack LGBT rights because that is
what illiberal populists are doing these days; Europe is the
scapegoat.
These concerns open up important and timely ques-
tions, which, together with the its strengths, make
Coming Out of Communism a book that should be
considered for use in introductory comparative politics
seminars for doctoral students.
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In their new book, Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William
Liddle, and Saiful Mujani want to provide a “corrective”
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to “sensationalist, sometimes even hysterical character-
izations of Muslim beliefs that in the West so often drive
public discourse” (p. 2). In order to do so, they examine
whether there is a relationship between levels of piety
among Indonesian Muslims and support for Islamist
political parties; whether piety affects opinions about,
and the use of, Islamic ﬁnancial products; and ﬁnally, if,
and if so how, piety shapes the way Indonesian Muslims
interact with the broader world.
The authors’ public opinion survey, administered in the
year 2008, found no systematic relationship between the
religious orientation of Indonesian Muslims and their
support for Islamist parties or Shari’a law. Levels of piety
also do not determine support for democracy, Islamic
ﬁnance, or views on foreign relations. In short, “evidence
that more religious Indonesian Muslims think or behave
differently than their less religious counterparts simply
does not exist” (p. 4).
Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani provide evidence for
their argument across four substantive chapters. Chapter
2 provides a discussion of “piety” and puts forward
a research method to measure levels of piety through
public opinion surveys. In Chapter 3, they examine
whether pious Muslims are more likely to support Islamist
parties that want to adopt Shari’a law than are less religious
Indonesians. They ﬁnd that “even among those respond-
ents who are most sympathetic to political Islam, Islamist
party ideologies only give parties an advantage over non-
Islamist parties when voters are uncertain about parties’
economy policy platforms” (p. 62). Chapter 4 asks
whether more pious Muslims are more likely to think
favorably about Islamic ﬁnance products and make more
frequent use of such services compared to their less
religious counterparts. The authors ﬁnd that levels of
religiosity do not determine the ways in which Muslims in
Indonesia engage with the modern market economy.
Finally, they ask whether the revitalization of Islam across
the archipelago has led to a reorientation among the
Indonesian population toward the Middle East and away
from the West. Here, the authors ﬁnd that more pious
Muslims indeed like to see closer relations with the Arab
world. However, such views do not compete with pious
Muslims’ preferences for engagement with other cultural
realms, including “the West,” Southeast Asia, and East
Asia. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the main ﬁndings
and a discussion of how the Indonesian case can inform
research in other Muslim-majority countries.
Piety and Public Opinion makes several important
theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions.
Its main theoretical contribution is the ﬁnding that factors
such as globalization and modernization, rather than levels
of religiosity, shape attitudes toward politics, the economy,
and the wider world in the largest Muslim-majority
country and third-largest democracy in the world. Meth-
odologically, the book’s thorough discussion on how to
operationalize “piety,” a much-studied but hitherto poorly
deﬁned concept, and how to make it suitable for public
opinion surveys will be of much use to academics working
on the relationship between religion and politics in other
Muslim-majority countries. Empirically, the book is
a powerful opening salvo for future comparative research
on whether the revitalization of Islam in Muslim-majority
societies will shape politics and public life in distinct ways.
In addition to a host of new questions raised, and which
are introduced by the authors in the ﬁnal chapter, there are
several additional issues that future research may want to
take into account. The book goes to great length to
conceptualize the main independent variable (piety) in
a comprehensive fashion. The dependent variables, how-
ever, could have been discussed more critically. For
instance, Chapter 3 examines whether levels of piety
determine support for Islamist parties and the adoption
of Shari’a law. The authors ﬁnd that more pious voters are
more likely to support Islamist parties if these parties put
forward a policy platform that is clearer to voters than the
policy platform of nationalist-secular parties. However, I
found the deﬁnition and conceptualization of “Islamist
party” and how that concept was then translated into
Indonesian rather problematic. Concretely, according to the
authors, “Islamist party” is to be understood as a party that
wants Shari’a law as the basis of the political system. In
contrast, an “Islamic party”may make frequent reference to
Islam during campaigns and in party platforms but does not
explicitly demand Shari’a law to be the basis of a political
system. Since the Indonesian language does not differentiate
between “Islamist” and “Islamic” party, the authors asked
respondents whether they would support a political party
based on Islam (partai politik yang berasas Islam) “wishing to
implement Islamic law.” However, there is no consensus,
not even among Islamist activists in Indonesia, as to what
actually constitutes “Islamic law.” Rather, Shari’a law has
been described as a “total discourse” that includes religious,
legal, moral, and economic rules and regulations.
Since there is no agreement on what constitutes
Islamic law, it has come to mean anything to anyone.
The authors could have said more about how a concept as
vague as Shari’a law potentially affects the book’s ﬁnding
that there is no relationship between levels of piety and
support for Islamist parties (i.e., parties that wish to
implement Shari’a law). Furthermore, the battery of
survey questions that Indonesians were exposed to in
order to test the relationship between levels of piety and
support for Islamist parties advocating the adoption of
Shari’a law asks about a purely hypothetical situation. Not
a single Indonesian party has called for the adoption of
Islamic law in a national election campaign for the past 17
years. In the words of a leading scholar on party politics in
Indonesia: “The issue of establishing an Islamic state or
introducing Islamic law in Indonesia was buried in 2002
during the last round of constitutional amendments, and
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no Muslim party has seriously raised it again ever since”
(Marcus Mietzner,Military Politics, Islam, and the State in
Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Con-
solidation (2009), p. 334). The authors’ claim— that “[p]
olitical parties in Indonesia range from avowedly pluralist
social democratic parties to openly Islamist parties” (p. 72)
— is therefore incorrect.
Likewise, the public opinion survey asked respondents
whether they are more likely to support a political party
that puts forward a clear agenda on how to improve the
Indonesian economy and citizens’ welfare, rather than
a party that lacks such a clear agenda. While the authors
went to great length to conceptualize and operationalize
“party platform,” this is again a rather artiﬁcial setup. In
reality, Indonesian politics are deeply transactional. In-
stead of having the choice between different party plat-
forms, or even clearly formulated and vague party
platforms, Indonesian voters are confronted with party
platforms that range from the fantastical to the outright
nonsensical. Since the country became a democracy in
1998, no Indonesian party has put forward a comprehen-
sive policy platform with concrete suggestions on how to
address the archipelago’s many problems.
In short, there is a need for a more critical discussion of
the fact that several of the dependent variables are either
understood in Indonesian society in a multitude of ways
(Shari’a law) or do not really correspond to the actual
political environment in Indonesia (Islamist party; eco-
nomic party platform) and how this may affect the validity
of the survey results.
Finally, the main ﬁnding that levels of piety are in-
consequential for democracy, partisan politics, support for
Shari’a law, and Islamic ﬁnance, as well as foreign relations,
leads the authors to conclude that “[p]ublic opinion . . . may
have no causal impact on policy outcomes at all” (p. 22).
Instead, they argue that elites play an important role in
shaping policymaking.While this conﬁrms previous research
on the role of Islam in Indonesian politics, more could have
been said about the rather complex interaction between elite-
driven politics and public opinion.
Since 1998, at least 700 Shari’a regulations have been
adopted across Indonesian provinces and districts. Most
of these laws directly violate the constitutional rights of
Indonesians. While this development may indeed be the
result of a top-down process initiated and maintained by
political elites, as this book and works by other scholars
suggest, the question concerning why Indonesian society
is not more vocal when it comes to resisting such
developments needs to be discussed. Public opinion
and even levels of piety may shape Indonesian policy-
making not so much by actively calling for certain policies
but by not resisting their adoption and subsequent
implementation.
Overall, the proposed conceptualization of “piety” and
the instructions on how it can be harnessed in public
opinion surveys in other contexts will be useful for scholars
working on other countries, while the empirical ﬁndings of
Piety and Public Opinion are guaranteed to stimulate
debate among area specialists.
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In increasingly unequal cities, what role can civil society
organizations play in promoting affordable housing?
Today, nearly a billion people worldwide live in in-
adequate housing, and the United Nations projects that
by 2030, the urban housing shortage will be of about 2
billion people (p. 5). At the same time, cities are
increasingly becoming sites of urban investment, and
their leaders are choosing market-driven strategies that
exacerbate urban inequalities. It is clear that urban
mobilization for affordable housing exists, but can
organizations play a role in actually deﬁning what more
affordable urban development will look like?
In this useful and extremely well researched book,
Maureen M. Donaghy draws our attention to a set of
questions that are generally ignored in urban sociology:
How do community-based organizations actually engage
institutions to shape development? And what are the
consequences of these choices? The answers to these
questions are based on richly developed case studies that
are then put in conversation. The author develops an
unusual—and quite productive—comparison of four
cities (Atlanta and Rio, for their Olympic development,
and São Paulo and Washington, DC, for their central-city
development strategies). Donaghy argues, generally speak-
ing, that organizations are more successful in protest in
“outside” strategies to prevent displacement than in “in-
side” strategies of proposing policies that would shape
urban development and secure the gains achieved other-
wise. This points us in important directions as we think
about how to construct a more democratic city.
In addition to a series of chapters dedicated to each of
the case studies, the book also includes a theory chapter
that offers a number of important correctives to the
literature, particularly the social movements scholarship.
By moving the discussion away from movement tactics
and the dichotomy of contention and cooperation that
mostly deﬁnes that literature, the book moves us to
consider the longer arc of strategies that movements adopt.
It also makes the very correct point that much of the
literature on governance assumes that movements are
inherently normatively oriented to participation, when
in fact there are a range of strategic orientations that are
responsive to opportunities and context.
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